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Introduction
Reciprocity is often referred to as one of the guiding norms for social interactions (Gouldner,
1960; Emerson, 1976). While many di↵erent theories of social exchanges and interactions
state that reciprocity fosters under repeated actions (Gouldner, 1960; Melamed and Simpson,
2016) and builds trust and cohesion over time (Friedkin, 2004; Molm, Schaefer and Collett,
2007), few studies examine reciprocity at the micro-level as a dynamic mechanism in relational
event sequences (e.g., Butts, 2008; Quintane et al., 2013; Kitts et al., 2016). How do nodes in
a network react to network changes initiated by other nodes surrounding them that can be
classified as reciprocated favors? This paper tackles this question by examining the dynamics
of reciprocity in two-mode network event sequences of Congressional cosponsorship events
using relational event models.
First introduced by Butts (2008), relational event models (REMs) can be used to model
sequences of network events (or event streams). More and more studies are using event se-
quences to understand the evolution of network structures (Vu et al., 2011; Zenk and Stadtfeld,
2010; De Nooy and Kleinnijenhuis, 2013; Lerner, Bussmann, Snijders and Brandes, 2013;
DuBois, Butts and Smyth, 2013; Quintane et al., 2013; Liang, 2014; Patison et al., 2015;
Tranmer et al., 2015; Welbers and de Nooy, 2014; Kitts et al., 2016; Leenders, Contractor
and DeChurch, 2016; Pilny et al., 2016; Xia, Mankad and Michailidis, 2016; Quintane and
Carnabuci, 2016; Pilny et al., 2017). However, few studies examine two-mode network event
sequences (De Nooy, 2011; Stadtfeld and Geyer-Schulz, 2011; Quintane et al., 2014; Malang,
Brandenberger and Leifeld, 2017).
The added temporal information on tie formation can be used to increase certainty in dom-
inant network structures and strengthen the testing of causal links in network formation and
evolution mechanisms. By examining individual cosponsoring actions, this article aims at ex-
amining whether reciprocity plays an convincing role in cosponsorship networks and whether
members of Congress react to supportive gestures by reciprocating them in the near future.
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Congressional cosponsorship is an inherently social act where new legislations are darfted
and proposed and cosponsoring signatures are used as signals to fellow members of Congress as
well as to said member’s constituents on positions or interests of each member (Fowler, 2006;
Mayhew, 1974; Campbell, 1982). Two types of cosponsoring activities are examined in this
article. The first deals with what Fowler (2006) calls ‘active cosponsorship’ which refers to the
support that is given to a soon to be introduced bill, for instance by drafting it, recruiting spon-
sors or otherwise promoting the bill. Active cosponsoring events present as cluster of members
working on the same bill and introducing it to Congress at a distinct point in time. The forma-
tion of these cosponsoring clusters can then be viewed as a sequence of clusters emerging over
time. The second type of cosponsoring activity deals with ‘passive cosponsorship’ (Fowler,
2006). Passive cosponsoring refers to the support individual members of Congress voice for
a bill after it has been introduced. As such, passive cosponsoring events present as two-mode
events involving a member and a bill and the specific date the cosponsorship signature was
given. This sequence of events involves temporally spread out activities after the introduction
of each bill.
Both types of event sequences show an inherent time-dependence in their node set com-
position. In other words, target nodes (bills) are continuously drafted and introduced over the
entire event sequence and this composition change a↵ects both estimation strategies for REMs
as well as the construction of the dynamic operationalization of reciprocity. The importance of
this time-varying node set composition becomes apparent, when comparing two possible event
sequences. Figure 1 shows a snapshot of a two-mode network, originating from two di↵erent
event sequences. The di↵erence in the timing and sequence of events becomes evident when ex-
amining a four-cycle. A four-cycle involving nodes i1, i2, j1 and j2 – shaded ties in Figure 1 – is
closed within the first four events in sequence A (and is reinforced afterwards) and takes much
longer to close in sequence B (event 16). By taking the timing and the sequence of network ties
into account, the four-cycle in sequence B appears much weaker. Long time intervals between
the four ties, or an abundance of di↵erent network ties forming in-between these events serve
as an indicator that four-cycles in sequence B are not a distinct mechanism of tie formation.
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Figure 1: Two possible event sequences resulting in the same network snapshot. Sender nodes
are represented as circles, target nodes as squares. Examining the sequence of network events
allows for stricter test of network formation mechanisms. However, if target nodes are intro-
duced over time, network formation mechanisms have to be adjusted. The four-cycle involving
the shaded ties closes faster in sequence A. However, if target node j2 is introduced to the
sequence only at event time 15, the four-cycle in sequence B closes equally fast.
However, this finding only holds, if all nodes in the target mode are available throughout the
entire event sequence. If, for instance, node j2 in sequence B only becomes available at event
time 15, the conclusion about four-cycles being weakly related to the structural evolution in
sequence B may be wrong. If j2 is only available at event time 15, the four-cycle closes at its
earliest possibility. Therefore, the temporal dependence in the node set composition of one or
both of the modes is crucial for the analysis of the evolution of two-mode networks.
This paper expands on the statistical methodology of relational event models and proposes
two methods of analysis for two-mode networks with time-varying node set composition in the
target mode. A large share of two-mode networks shows an inherent time-dependence in their
target mode. For instance, the target mode of author–paper networks is a sequence of papers,
where ties to each paper are fixed in time and cannot be drawn later on. Other examples of
two-mode networks with a time-dependent target mode include networks of event attendance,
or networks of research projects and associated departments, where ties indicate prolonged but
temporally limited engagements.
This paper proposes two di↵erent estimation strategies to handle REMs with time-varying
node set composition in the target mode. The first adaption of REMs examines how clusters of
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members of Congress emerge over time and a↵ect the subsequent formation of new collabora-
tion clusters. Apart from congressional collaboration clusters, other two-mode event sequences
that exhibit unrepeatable target nodes over time can be examined in the same manner, such as
dynamic co-authorship event sequences, research cluster sequences or event attendance net-
works.
The second adaption explores the reaction time of members embedded in networks by ex-
amining the time it takes until a tie is formed. Using passive cosponsorship data, the method is
used to examine whether the norm to reciprocate previous support expedites a member’s deci-
sion to support a newly introduced bill. By examining the time it takes for a member to cospon-
sor a bill, the model can test whether receiving a favor from one of the original cosponsors is
reciprocated by issuing cosponsoring support at the next possible event. Other applications
of this REM variation could examine the time it takes an actor to veto a specific proposal or
examine which intermediate actions by others in the network spur an actor to issue a sanction
(i.e., by examining time-to-sanction in a duration model).
Results of these two REM variations on cosponsorship suggest that in both active and pas-
sive cosponsoring, reciprocity may play a di↵erent role than previously assumed. Previous
studies on cosponsorship report strong tendencies of members to reciprocate cosponsorship
support (Bratton and Rouse, 2011; Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011). However, when analyzing
cosponsorship as an event sequence, results show a slightly more diverse picture. In active
cosponsorship, Republican members show strong tendencies to reciprocate support that was
issued in the near past, whereas Democratic members of Congress show negative e↵ects of
reciprocity on future collaborations. In passive cosponsorship, reciprocity does not expedite
support statements, in fact, for Democratic members, the e↵ects are reversed and support for
bills that can be seen as a show of reciprocity are issued later in time and not directly after
favors were given.
These findings suggest that REM specifications for these two-mode event sequences are
able to examine common network patterns – such as reciprocity – whilst adhering to the com-
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plex dynamics of composition changes in the target mode and deliver temporally sensitive
findings that outshine cross-sectional findings.
After a section on the role of reciprocity in legislative networks, two estimation strategies
for REMs are discussed, followed by a discussion of the e↵ect of time-varying node set com-
positions on the calculation of the endogenous reciprocity statistic. All suggested procedures
in this contribution are made available in the BLINDED-package (BLINDED) for the statistical
computing environment R (R Core Team, 2016).
Trading Favors - Congressional Cosponsoring and the Norm
of Reciprocity
Cosponsorship of legislative proposals (henceforth referred to as bills1) has been widely studied
with and without a network approach (examples include Mayhew, 1974; Kessler and Krehbiel,
1996; Wilson and Young, 1997; Fowler, 2006; Barnello and Bratton, 2007; Cranmer and Des-
marais, 2011; Desmarais and Cranmer, 2012; Kirkland, 2011; Kirkland and Gross, 2014; Lee,
Magallanes and Porter, 2015; Craig et al., 2015). There are several intrinsic reasons for a mem-
ber of Congress to cosponsor a bill. First, the content of the bill reflects a member’s own view-
points on the subject, motivating them to support the proposition. The importance of signaling
a position to a member’s constituents or other members of Congress could be one of the moti-
vating personal factors (Mayhew, 1974; Campbell, 1982; Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996). Second,
cosponsors may be influenced by sponsors or original cosponsors, with whom they worked to-
gether on the bill or lobbied in Congress for support. Third, it is possible that the action of
other members convince a member to support a specific bill (e.g., Tam Cho and Fowler, 2010;
Craig et al., 2015). Fourth, members of Congress can be brought together by lobbying groups
outside parliament to carry a bill (see for instance Hojnacki and Kimball, 1999). Furthermore,
empirical findings further suggest that triadic closure and homophily e↵ects are powerful struc-
tural patterns in cosponsorship networks (Bratton and Rouse, 2011; Cranmer and Desmarais,
1The term bill is used for any piece of legislation, be it a bill, a resolution or an amendment.
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2011). Homophily e↵ects span across the dimensions of gender, party, same state and ethnicity
(Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011; Craig et al., 2015). Lastly, the social norm to reciprocate pre-
vious support may foster lively cosponsoring activities among members of Congress. Issuing
cosponsoring support for a bill may guarantee future support from other members as the issued
support can act as a gift sharing action that demands reciprocation through social convention.
This article focuses on this exchange mechanism—reciprocity—as an intrinsic reason to
collaborate on and cosponsor new bills. Reciprocity, also referred to as dyadic exchange, favor
trading or mutuality, refers to the dyadic construct that shapes the interaction patterns of two
actors (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). It measures to what extent an interaction or exchange
takes place between two actors i and j embedded in network N:
reciprocity(N) =
X
i, j
Ni j · Nji (1)
Social Exchange Theory postulates that reciprocity is an important building block of social
interactions (for an overview, see Emerson, 1976; Cook et al., 2013). Actors choose to ‘invest’
in certain social bonds and in turn expect rewards from their investment. If these rewards are not
satisfactory, actors will modify their behavior or choose to discontinue a relationship (Emerson,
1976; Ikkink and Van Tilburg, 1999, 341). Thus reciprocity emerges as a strong mechanism
that guides social interactions over time.
Furthermore, reciprocity is considered one of the most important norms and is crucial in the
maintenance of stable social systems (Gouldner, 1960). In game theoretic settings, it has been
shown that reciprocity is a basic element of human behavior that strengthens trust bonds be-
tween di↵erent actors (e.g., Axelrod, 2006; Trivers, 1971; Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995;
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). In network settings, reci-
procity is a central component in explaining the structure of friendship networks (for example
Mercken et al., 2010; Schaefer et al., 2010; Harrigan and Yap, 2017), animal social networks
(e.g., Tranmer et al., 2015), trade and social commerce networks (e.g., Stephen and Toubia,
2009), interpersonal relationships and exchanges (e.g., Plickert, Cote and Wellman, 2007), on-
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line social networks (e.g., Ammann, 2011; Surma, 2016) or inter-state networks (e.g., Cran-
mer, Heinrich and Desmarais, 2014; Maoz et al., 2006), to name a few. Empirical findings on
cosponsorship show that by lending cosponsoring support to particular members involved in
drafting a bill, the focal member may be inclined to reciprocate previous support (Bratton and
Rouse, 2011; Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011).
A central component of reciprocity is time. Emerson (1976, 359) stresses the importance
of studying long time-spans of social relations, since the inherent pattern exhibited through
reciprocal behavior only emerges in longitudinal settings. In long-term settings repeated in-
teractions between actors often exhibit a great amount of reciprocity or redundancy. Several
previous studies observe these temporal dynamics of reciprocity in various settings.
A first study by Kitts et al. (2016) investigates the time horizon of reciprocity dynamics
by studying patient exchange event sequences. By classifying two forms of patient exchanges,
complementary exchanges (where patients are exchanged across-specialties) and competitive
exchanges (transfers within specialties), they are able to show that reciprocity e↵ects di↵er
according to the setting. In complementary exchanges they find ample evidence of reciprocity
e↵ects, both with hospitals that have transferred many of their patients to them in the past
(short-term and long-term) and with hospitals from whom they received the most patients in
the past (short-term) (Kitts et al., 2016, 38-9). In competitive exchanges no reciprocity e↵ects
are present, indicating that an alternative logic guides these exchanges (Kitts et al., 2016, 40).
Another study by Leifeld and Brandenberger (2017) finds that reciprocity is the driving
force in coalition formation processes in policy debates. Using data from policy actors’ state-
ments on how to address the pension problem in Germany over the course of a nine year long
debate, they are able to show that actors reciprocate supportive statements on policy beliefs
from people with whom they agreed upon policy beliefs in the recent past. Furthermore, ac-
tors have a tendency to pick up policy beliefs from actors with whom they disagreed upon in
the past and proclaim their disagreement with these beliefs anew. These positive and negative
forms of reciprocity can account for bonding strategies seen in policy networks.
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A third study by Quintane et al. (2013) shows evidence of short-term reciprocity e↵ects
by examining e-mail exchanges among members of two project teams. They use short-term
and long-term statistics to evaluate the e↵ects of reciprocity on the hazard of event occurrence.
Short-term reciprocity is captured by past interactions involving two members in the past 24
hours, where as long-term reciprocity is operationalized as the frequency of reciprocated ac-
tions during the past trimester (Quintane et al., 2013, 533-4). They find that both short-term
and long-term reciprocity are positive predictors of e-mail communications, with the short-
term e↵ect exhibiting slightly stronger e↵ects (Quintane et al., 2013, 535-6). They conclude
that “while the very notion of reciprocity invokes the expectation of a response or reply, the
observation of reciprocity during di↵erent time frames [i.e., short-term and long-term] may be
a reflection of deep sociotemporal cycles that guide and reflect norms of behavior” (Quintane
et al., 2013, 536).
These studies show the importance of accounting for time between reciprocated dyadic
events. The present study aims at studying reciprocity dynamics in legislative collaboration
events and asks the question to what extent are cosponsoring activities among members of
Congress guided by reciprocity, and more importantly, what time horizons matter in explaining
reciprocity e↵ects? Previous studies have shown that congressional cosponsorship is, among
other factors, guided by reciprocity (Bratton and Rouse, 2011; Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011).
This paper examines whether cosponsoring signatures are issued in response to temporally
close exchanges of support, or if reciprocity becomes evident only in the long run as a result of
aggregated events.
To answer these questions, legislative cosponsoring signatures are analyzed as a sequence
of events. Legislative reciprocity has been studied widely using aggregated network snapshots,
either as cross-sectional snapshots (Bratton and Rouse, 2011; Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011)
or in a longitudinal setting using multiple snapshots where ties are aggregated over di↵erent
time slices (Desmarais and Cranmer, 2012). This paper uses a di↵erent approach.
Rather than aggregating cosponsoring events into network snapshots, the events are an-
alyzed individually as micro-steps in an event sequence. As such, each event consists of a
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member of Congress that ties to a legislative proposal at a distinct point in time, forming a
two-mode network event sequence. Two-mode networks are a special kind of network where
sender mode and target mode stem from di↵erent sets of nodes that can only interact between
the modes, not within (Borgatti and Everett, 1997). Examples of two-mode networks are nu-
merous and include author–paper networks (e.g., Newman, Strogatz and Watts, 2001; Morris,
Yen et al., 2005), company–board member networks (e.g., Robins and Alexander, 2004; Ev-
erard and Henry, 2002), research projects–research departments networks (e.g., Mote, 2005),
sexual a liation networks (e.g., Niekamp et al., 2013; Ergün, 2002), online group activity net-
works (e.g., Zhu, Huang and Contractor, 2013; Conaldi and Lomi, 2013) and event attendance
networks (e.g., Faust et al., 2002). Several network studies use projection methods to transform
two-mode networks into one-mode networks for the sake of simplification (Borgatti and Ev-
erett, 1997; Latapy, Magnien and Del Vecchio, 2008; Guillaume and Latapy, 2006). Two-mode
event sequences are di cult to project since the two events that result in a one-mode tie could
have occurred at two di↵erent time points and it is unclear which time point should be allo-
cated to the one-mode event. Broccatelli, Everett and Koskinen (2016), however, provide an
innovative method to transform two-mode event sequences into bi-dynamic line-graphs. This
article focuses on two-mode sequences as they are and refrains from projecting to avoid ad-
ditional potential problems with projection, such as loss of information on the target mode or
an overestimation of triadic closure e↵ects (Borgatti and Everett, 1997; Latapy, Magnien and
Del Vecchio, 2008; Opsahl, 2013; Everett and Borgatti, 2013).
Figure 2 represents an extract from a possible cosponsoring event sequence. Two di↵erent
types of events can be identified. The first event type deals with active cosponsoring. Active
cosponsoring represents members who pose as ‘original cosponsors’ on soon to be introduced
bills. A cluster of original cosponsors often drafts and promotes the bill before one of them,
the sponsor, presents it to Congress (Fowler, 2006, 458-9). Since the rules of the U.S. House of
Representatives do not allow more than one o cial sponsor for each bill, additional members
who were involved in drafting or promoting a bill are listed as ‘original cosponsors’ upon the
introduction of the bill to Congress.
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Figure 2: Illustration of a cosponsoring event sequence. Members are represented as circles,
bills as squares. Dark-grey shaded events are active cosponsoring events, where members
introduce new bills to Congress. Lightly-shaded bills are passive cosponsoring events, where
members issue support for already introduced bills.
The question is, how does reciprocity shape new collaboration clusters? In a first analysis,
this paper examines whether the norm of reciprocity brings members to work together if they
have previously received cosponsoring support from one another.
The second event type deals with passive cosponsoring. Passive cosponsoring refers to
Congressional support issued after a bill has been formally introduced to Congress. Here,
members choose to sign a bill to signal their position, reciprocate previous support from the
sponsor and original cosponsors in the past or try to make new alliances (Fowler, 2006, 458-
9). However, how exactly does the norm of reciprocity express itself with regard to the timing
of these cosponsoring events? In a second analysis, this paper examines whether the norm of
reciprocity brings members to show their support for a newly introduced bill earlier, if they
have previously received support for their own bills by members that introduced the new bill.
In other words, it is examined if previous support triggers actions that can be classified as
expressions of reciprocity. The details of how the two event types are analyzed are described
in the following section.
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Methodological Approach: Expanding Two-Mode Relational
Event Models
Relational Event Models: a Brief Overview
Relational event models build on survival or event history analysis. A sequence of events
involving a sender node, a target node and a time stamp (or ordinal time) represent micro-
steps (or individual edges occurring over time) in a network. The underlying assumption of
REMs is that past network events and exogenous covariates a↵ect the occurrence of events.
Controlling for said endogenous and exogenous covariates, these events can be considered
conditionally independent of one another and can therefore be analyzed using conventional
regression models (Butts, 2008; Lerner, Indlekofer, Nick and Brandes, 2013). REMs model
this occurrence of events using a piecewise constant hazard model, where the hazard of an
event occurring is held constant within a time interval.
The likelihood that a specific number of events ni j(t) take place on a dyad (i, j) within the
time interval t is given by the hazard rate  i j(t), and then multiplied by the survival function
exp(  i j(t)), which captures all events that could have occurred at time t yet did not (see Lerner,
Bussmann, Snijders and Brandes 2013, 18-9 and Butts 2008, 161-3):
Pr(ni j(t)) =
 i j(t)ni j(t) · exp(  i j(t))
ni j(t)!
. (2)
Furthermore, multiplying over all dyads and all time intervals t1 to tN in the event sequence
E, the probability density of the event sequence is
f (E; ✓ ) =
tNY
t=t1
0
BBBBBB@
Y
i j2Dact(t)
 i j(t)ni j(t)
ni j(t)!
1
CCCCCCA · exp
0
BBBBBB@ 
X
i j2D
 i j(t)
1
CCCCCCA , (3)
where Dact(t) represents all dyads in which at least one event occurred over the entire event
sequence and D represents all possible events that could have potentially occurred (Lerner,
Bussmann, Snijders and Brandes, 2013, 18-9). For a more detailed derivation and specification
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of the rate function, see Lerner, Bussmann, Snijders and Brandes (2013, 14-9) or Butts (2008,
161-3). D represents the risk set, which can be specified dynamically for each time interval t.
To estimate the e↵ects endogenous or exogenous variables have on the hazard rate, REMs
use duration models to model time-to-next-event for continuous-time event sequences and con-
ditional logistic regression models for ordinal-time sequences to model the e↵ects on the prob-
ability that an event occurred now, given it has not occurred yet (Butts, 2008).
Analyzing Sequences With Unique Target Nodes
Active cosponsoring events group together over time, representing clusters of sender nodes
(i.e., members) involved in unique target nodes (i.e., bills) that do not repeat themselves over
the course of the event sequence. To analyze the formation of new sponsoring clusters, each
introduction of a new bill represents an unrepeatable event in the event sequence. The target
mode, therefore, consists of bills that are continuously drafted by one or more members of
Congress that represent the sender mode.
This specific form of the event sequence, involving unrepeatable target nodes, calls for an
adaption of the ordinal-time relational event models presented by Butts (2008). The reason is
that the corresponding events are only at risk at one time during the sequence and no null-events
can be created for the true events. As such, the event history framework that is generally used
to model ordinal event sequences via conditional logistic regressions, poses a problem.
Figure 3 illustrates an event sequence where the target nodes represent parliamentary bills.
These bills can only be introduced once over the entire event sequence and can therefore be
considered non-repetitive. One or more sender nodes (i.e., members) work together to introduce
the bill at time t. Since bills j are non-repeatable, they cannot be used in the creation of the risk
set D in Equation 3. However, instead of modeling the hazard of event occurrence, a logistic
regression can test which factors have lead specific members to engage in the creation of a bill
while others have not.2 For each unrepeatable or unique bill in the target mode new events are
2This approach is similar to the use of logistic regressions in Exponential Random Graph Models, but, as cluster
formations are modeled as micro-steps over time, the estimation of the parameters a↵ecting cluster formation do
not violate the independence assumption (Butts, 2008; Lerner, Indlekofer, Nick and Brandes, 2013).
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Figure 3: Event sequence where cluster of nodes simultaneously join the network. Sender
nodes are represented as circles, target nodes as squares. A logistic regression can be used
to examine which factors lead to the emergence of a specific collaboration cluster by adding
null-events for sender nodes that did not engage in the respective target node.
created with members of Congress that did not engage in the bill, and therefore form a control
group.
In the example sequence in Figure 3, the second bill was sponsored by two members (i2,
j2) and (i4, j2). As such, all other unique members form a control group and are added as null
events in the form of edges (ix, j2), with x referring to members other than i2 or i4. Combining
true events and control events for each bill results in a dataset consisting of groups of 0/1-
cases. Temporal reciprocity statistics as well as other endogenous variables can be calculated
for each true and control event. A logistic regression over all bill-clusters determines which
endogenous and exogenous factors are predictive of members engaging with other members in
the introduction of a new bill. This model allows the examination of whether members start
working together in order to reciprocate cosponsoring support on previous bills.
Analyzing Sequences With Time-Varying Node Set Compositions
Passive cosponsoring event sequences preset as another interesting event sequence. As bills
are continuously drafted and introduced to Congress, the target nodes in the event sequence
present as time-dependent, making the existence of an event (i.e., a member cosponsoring a
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bill) dependent upon its introduction status. Each introduction of a new bill to Congress spurs
new passive cosponsoring events as a reaction to said introduction.
Rather than examining time-to-next-event or the ordinal sequence of events, as done in
other REM approaches, the introduction events can be used to examine time-to-cosponsoring,
i.e., the reaction time until a member of congress signals support to an introduced bill by adding
their signature to it. New Congressional bills are continually drafted, however, once created,
bills can only be supported until they have passed (or failed) a vote. Therefore, after a bill
has been voted on, no new supporting ties can link to it. Thus, each introduction of a new bill
rewinds the clock for all subsequent events on that bill. The time until a sender node engages
in a newly created target node may therefore be used as a rate indicator, or duration. Duration
in the time-to-cosponsoring model is calculated as
duration(Gt, a, b) = tpc(a, b)   tace (i, b), (4)
the current time t minus the time te in the network of past events Gt, when bill b was first
introduced to Congress by active cosponsoring members i (see Figure 4).
The faster the cosponsoring support is issued after the formal introduction of the bill, the
stronger the signal of the member’s position on the issue or their willingness to form future part-
nerships. Therefore, passive cosponsorship can be modeled using the time-since introduction
of the bill as duration in a stratified Cox model.
This model allows the question whether members of Congress tend to issue support state-
ments faster in order to reciprocate previous support by one of the active sponsors of the bill.
More specifically, the model can test whether members react to favors by reciprocating soon
after receiving them.
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Figure 4: Passive cosponsorship event sequence. Sender nodes are represented as circles, target
nodes as squares. A stratified Cox model can be used to examine time-to-cosponsoring. For
instance, event (a, b) could have occurred on two previous events since the target bill was
introduced. As such, the event creates two null-events that form the control group for previous
events.
Endogenous Reciprocity Statistics
Reciprocity as a dynamic, closing four-cycle. In the two-mode cosponsorship network (M),
reciprocity is captured via a four-cycle statistic.
reciprocity(M) =
X
i,k, j,l
Mi j · Mk j · Mil · Mkl (5)
The statistic captures a sender i’s tendency to engage in a target node j that is linked to by
other senders k with whom i engaged in other targets l. In the dynamic setting of two-mode
relational event models, reciprocity is operationalized as a so-called closing four-cycle, where
three events in the past build up a four-cycle and the current in the sequence closes it. The
events that occurred prior to a focal event in the event sequence form a network of past events:
Gt = Gt(E) = (A; B; wt), (6)
where E = (e1, e2, ..., en) represents the set of events, A is the set of nodes from the first
mode, B the set of nodes from the second mode and wt is the weight function that is applied to
each event before time t.
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The weight function can take di↵erent forms, with its simplest form representing a 0/1
weight for past events:
et(i, j) =
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
0 if we = 0
1 if we > 0
(7)
Alternatively, the weight function wt can use an exponential decay, so that events which
occurred in the recent past are weighted more than events that took place further in the past.
wt(i, j) =
X
e:ae=i,be= j,
te<=t
|we| · e (t te)·(
ln(2)
T1/2
) · ln(2)
T1/2
(8)
where i = ae 2 A and j = be 2 B, we is the weight of the prior event e, t is the current
time, te is the time of the prior event e. T1/2 represents the value of the half-life parameter. The
half-life parameter specifies at which rate the weight of past events diminishes. A larger half-
life parameter results in a slower decay, which means that time di↵erences matter less when
looking back over the past events (Lerner, Bussmann, Snijders and Brandes, 2013).
To examine whether reciprocity plays a role in legislative cosponsoring, reciprocity is op-
erationalized as a closing four-cycle, where the endogenous network statistic is given more
weight to the present event if it closes an open four-cycle:
closingFourCycle(Gt; a, b) =
P
i2A,
j2B
et(a, j) · et(i, b) · et(i, j)
P
i2A,
j2B
et(i, b) · et(i, j)
(9)
The e↵ect measures whether a has a higher tendency to tie to b if a shared many other
targets j with other senders i in the past, and said senders i tied to b. The statistic is scaled
using the sum of all events involving dyads {i, b} and dyads {i, j} because with the passage of
time, the frequency counts increase and would otherwise distort the four-cycle statistic (Butts,
2008; Quintane et al., 2014).
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Alternatively, the statistic can be adapted to include exponential time-weighting:
closingFourCycle(Gt; a, b) =
X
i2A,
j2B
wt(a, j) · wt(i, b) · wt(i, j) (10)
Each of the past three events is weighted according to time. The longer ago and the fewer
times a tie was drawn in the past, the less weight is given to the current event for the respective
statistic. As such, the four-cycle e↵ect is stronger if the four events occurred in close temporal
proximity to each other. No additional scaling is necessary for this statistic, as the weighted
past events already account for the passage of time.
Reciprocity in active cosponsoring. For active cosponsorship, reciprocity is measured by
the number of times the current member a has received cosponsoring support from another
member i and subsequently starts working with i on a new bill b. Due to the time-varying
nature of the two-mode event sequence of active and passive cosponsorship, the weighted four-
cycle statistic in Equation 10 is adapted.
Since the present event (a, b) takes place at the same time as event (i, b) for the active
cosponsoring sequence, there is no need to weight this event, which is why the event is reduced
to a simple 0/1-dummy using edge-function eact in Equation 11. The superscripts ac and pc to
the edge- and weight-functions in Equations 11-13 represent active and passive cosponsoring
events, respectively.
The time-weighting of dyad (i, j) presents an additional problem because more weight is
given to cosponsoring events of i that occurred in close proximity to the present event. Figure 5
exemplifies the problem. Three sequences are presented, named A, B and C and show closing
four-cycles for event (a, b) at time t = 60. Sequence A and B di↵er only by event (i, j) which
occurs faster in sequence A and later in sequence B. Intuitively, the four-cycle in sequence
A should be given more weight, since i decided to cosponsor j faster than in sequence B,
indicating stronger support for this bill. However, the weight-function wt gives more weight
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1 10 50 60
B
1 31 50 60
C
40 47 50 60
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b
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a
j
a
j
i
b
i
b
a
weighted
0.0088
0.0112
0.0211
reduced
0.1649
0.1649
0.2588
adapted
0.0485
0.0380
0.0778
Figure 5: E↵ects of fully time-weighted four-cycle statistics, reduced time-weighted statistics
and adapted time-weighted statistics are presented using three example event sequences. A
fully time-weighted statistic results in a larger four-cycle statistic for event sequence B than
A, even tough it took i longer to react to the introduction of bill j in sequence B than A. To
correct this, the reduced time-weighted statistic does not weight the appearance of event (i, j)
in time, resulting in the same four-cycle statistic for both sequences A and B. Alternatively,
the adapted four-cycle statistic can account for the time it took i to cosponsor j, resulting in a
higher four-cycle statistic for sequence A than B.
to event closer to the current event, lending more weight to the four-cycle in sequence B (see
tabled values for ‘weighted’ in Figure 5). To correct this, the past event involving (i, j) can be
reduced to a 0/1-weight (labeled ‘reduced’ in Figure 5). Alternatively, the reaction time of i
to bill j can be incorporated into the four-cycle statistic by adding an additional exponential
weight involving said reaction time, as done in Equation 12 (labeled ‘adapted’ in Figure 5).
Sequence C demonstrates that events closer in time to the current event are given more weight
in all three calculations of the statistics.
Lastly, in order to calculate the average closing four-cycle e↵ect for each current active
sponsor of bill b, Equation 12 has to be divided by the number of active cosponsors of bill b
(see Equation 13).
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reciprocity_activeCosp(Gt; a, b) =
X
i2A\{a}; j2B\{b}
wact (a, j) · eact (i, b) · epct (i, j) (11)
=
X
i2A\{a}; j2B\{b}
wact (a, j) · eact (i, b) · epct (i, j) · e
( (|ta j ti j |)· ln(2)T1/2 ) (12)
=
P
i2A\{a}; j2B\{b}
wact (a, j) · eact (i, b) · epct (i, j) · e
( (|ta j ti j |)· ln(2)T1/2 )
P
i2A\{a}
et(i, b)
(13)
Reciprocity in passive cosponsoring. For passive cosponsorship, reciprocity is measured
by the number of times the average active cosponsor of the focal bill b cosponsored a bill
introduced by focal member a.
The basic closing four-cycle REM statistic for reciprocity in passive cosponsoring se-
quences is the same as for the active cosponsoring sequence (i.e., Equation 9). However, when
incorporating time-weighting using the exponential decay function into the reciprocity statis-
tic, Equation 10 again has to be adapted. As with reciprocity for active cosponsorship, the
weighted term wpct (i, j) would benefit members i that cosponsored bills j later on. To correct
this, the term is transformed into a 0/1-dummy and an additional decay function is added to
give more weight to events (i, j) where little time has passed since the introduction of bill j at
time ta j and i’s cosponsoring event at time ti j. Furthermore, the weighted term wact (i, b) should
not be included, since the time di↵erence between the current event t and the time of event (i, b)
(earlier referred to as te) is equal to the duration measure (see Equation 4). The incorporation
of the duration time into an independent variable violates the exogeneity rule postulated by
Lancaster (1990).3
Therefore, the reciprocity statistics in both their basic form as well as with time-weighting
are formulated as follows:
3Section 4 in the SI Online discusses this problem in more detail and shows that the inclusion of the duration
time into the operationalization of an endogenous network statistic confounds the significance of the e↵ects of the
variable in the estimation of the hazard rate.
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reciprocity_passiveCosp(Gt; a, b) =
P
i2A,
j2B
eact (a, j) · eact (i, b) · epct (i, j)
P
i2A,
j2B
et(i, b) · et(i, j)
(14)
=
P
i2A\{a}; j2B\{b}
wact (a, j) · eact (i, b) · epct (i, j) · e
( (|ta j ti j |)· ln(2)T1/2 )
P
i2A\{a}
et(i, b)
. (15)
Data and Variables
Data
To analyze how cosponsorship dynamics evolve over time, data on cosponsoring events in
the U.S. House of Representatives for the 113th Congress are used. While the analysis is
constrained to bills from the energy policy area due to computational restrictions, network
e↵ects are calculated over all 123,587 cosponsoring events of the 113th Congress. Data were
taken from the webpage of the U.S. Congress4. Information gathered includes the original
sponsor and the cosponsors of the bill (as well as the corresponding dates), the form, title, full
text and policy area of the bill and its status.
In order to preserve the sequence of events, each member’s cosponsoring actions were
recorded as single events, containing the unique member’s name a 2 A, the ID of the bill b 2 B
and the day on which the bill was (co-)sponsored t 2 T . The resulting event sequence contains
123,587 events, involving 352 members of Congress and 6841 bills, spread out over the course
of the two years during which the 113th Congress was in session. Federal holidays5 were
excluded from the event sequence, as well as five weeks of vacation in summer6. Weekends
were not excluded because several members had records of cosponsoring bills on Saturdays
as well as Sundays. The analysis of the event sequence is restricted to all events after June,
4
https://www.congress.gov last accessed March 9, 2016.
5Namely New Year’s Day, Martin Luther King Day, Inauguration Day, Presidents’ Day, Memorial Day, Inde-
pendence Day, Columbus Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving, Christmas
6Summer vacation from August 3rd to September 5th in 2013 and August 11th to 7th September in 2014 were
excluded.
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Table 1: Correlation matrix for reciprocity variables for both the active and passive cosponsor-
ing data sets
Active Cosponsoring Passive Cosponsoring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Basic statistic 1 1
(2) Time-weighted, T1/2 = 20 0.469 1 0.558 1
(3) Time-weighted, T1/2 = 50 0.643 0.882 1 0.728 0.862 1
(4) Time-weighted, T1/2 = 100 0.722 0.731 0.951 1 0.787 0.698 0.941 1
(5) Time-weighted, T1/2 = 200 0.75 0.59 0.841 0.962 1 0.769 0.56 0.813 0.956 1
4th, 2013. The exclusion of the first 150 event days (corresponding to the date of June, 4th,
2013) is necessary to calibrate the endogenous network statistics and prevent bias due to an
underrepresented network of past events Gt.
For each member of Congress, their party alignment, gender, age, consecutive years of
service, district, state and their ideology were assigned to each event involving the respective
member. 7
Independent Variables
Reciprocity variables for active and passive cosponsoring are operationalized as described
in the previous section. The standard closing four-cycle statistic (Equation 9) is calculated
for each true and null-event over the past events, represented by Gt. Additionally, the time-
weighted statistic (Equations 13 and 15 for active and passive cosponsoring, respectively) are
calculated using four di↵erent half-life specifications. The first statistic uses a half-life of 20
event days to discount four-cycles involving bills j that a sponsored in the past. Additional
statistics use increased half-life parameters of 50, 100 and 200 event days. As for the second
decay-parameter—measuring the influence of a past bill j through the reaction time of member
i’s cosponsoring action—is set at 20 event days for all four variables.
Table 1 holds the Pearson correlation matrices for all operationalizations of the reciprocity
variables for both the active and passive cosponsorship data sets. The correlations vary from
moderate to strong, indicating some variance between the di↵erent operationalizations of the
7Basic demographic information was taken from the Sunlight Foundation (https://sunlightlabs.
github.io/congress/index.html#legislator-spreadsheet, last accessed March 9, 2016). Data on mem-
ber’s ideology is the 1st dimension DW-NOMINATE score of McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) obtained from
http://www.voteview.com/dwnomin_joint_house_and_senate.htm.
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variables. The terms with the smallest half-life parameters of 20 event days measure short-term
reciprocity, where favors are remembered more vividly if they occurred in the very recent past.
The terms with larger half-life parameters measure reciprocity in the longer run by giving more
weight to favors that occurred in the past 3 to 6 months. The basic reciprocity statistic correlates
strongly with long-term reciprocity in both data sets.
Control Variables
Both the logistic regression on the formation of cosponsoring clusters as well as the stratified
Cox on the time-to-cosponsoring include a number of control variables. Relational event mod-
els only produce unbiased estimates if the endogenous network properties are captured fully
though the inclusion of independent or control variables (Butts, 2008, 160). Therefore, several
endogenous network statistics are added as control variables.
First, both models include a term measuring previous work relationships by calculating the
number of times the focal member has collaborated with one of the other active cosponsors of
the focal bill:
previousSponsorship(Gt; a, b) =
P
i2A\{a}; j2B\{b}
wact (a, j) · eact (i, b) · eact (i, j)
P
i2A\{a}
eact (i, b)
(16)
A second term measures cosponsoring similarity between the focal actor and other actors
sponsoring the focal bill. The term represents a closing four-cycle, but opposed to the reci-
procity statistic, this term measures how often focal actor a and another active sponsor of the
bill i have passively cosponsored another bill j:
cosponsoringSimilarity(Gt; a, b) =
P
i2A\{a}; j2B\{b}
wpct (a, j) · eact (i, b) · epct (i, j) · e
( (|tacj  ti j |)·
ln(2)
T1/2
)
P
i2A\{a}
eact (i, b)
(17)
A third term measures each focal actor’s sponsoring or cosponsoring activity by summing
up all past active and passive cosponsoring events where actor a has been involved in and
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weighting them according to how long ago these events took place, giving more weight to
more recent events:
activity(Gt; a, b) =
X
j2B
wt(a, j) (18)
In the case of active cosponsorship, a shared partner e↵ect measures whether two members
are likely to work on a bill together if they have worked with the same people on di↵erent bills
in the past. The term captures triadic closure in two-mode networks:
triadicClosure(Gt; a, b) =
P
i22A\{i1}; j12B\{ j2}
i12A\{i2}; j22B\{ j1}
wact (a, j1) · eact (i2, b) · eact (i1, j1) · eact (i1, j2) · eact (i2, j2)
P
i22A\{a}
eact (i2, b)
(19)
And in the case of passive cosponsorship, a bill popularity statistic measures the e↵ect of
previous passive cosponsoring activity on the focal bill b on a member’s time-to-cosponsoring:
billPopularity(Gt; a, b) =
X
i2A
wpct (i, b) (20)
Additionally, both models include homophily and absolute di↵erence terms to capture at-
tribute similarities between the focal actor a and all active sponsors of the focal bill b. Several
previous studies on legislative cosponsorship have shown that homophily is a powerful force in
explaining support patterns among members of Congress (e.g., Craig et al., 2015). Similarities
between two members of Congress can strengthen their relationship and create tighter bonds
(Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954). Therefore, controlling for various homophily patterns results
in a stronger test for temporal reciprocity patterns in cosponsoring event sequences.
homophily(Gt, a, b) =
X
i2A
et(i, b)[xa = xi] (21)
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The attribute homophily term in Equation 21 is used to calculate gender, state and ethnicity
homophily as well as neighboring state homophily (the last one using an adapted homophily
term).
absoluteDifference(Gt, a, b) =
X
i2A
et(i, b) · |za   zi| (22)
The absolute di↵erence term in Equation 22 is used to control for ideological di↵erences
between the focal actor a and the active cosponsors. Additionally, di↵erences in years of service
are controlled for as well.
In addition to the endogenous network statistics and homophily or absolute di↵erence vari-
ables, each member’s gender, experience—measured in the form of years of service—as well
as their deviance from the mean ideology are controlled for. Section 1 in the SI Online shows
graphical representations of the endogenous network statistics as well as additional information
on all control variables.
Rescaling of Endogenous Network Statistics
All endogenous network variables that use the exponential decay to control for the passage of
time are rescaled by a constant to ensure interpretability of the coe cient sizes. In the case of
the reciprocity variables, all variables are rescaled by the constant representing one additional
four-cycle, where wt(a, j) occurred 60 days ago and i gave cosponsor support to bill j 5 days
after a submitted it. Table 2 reports the rescaling constants for all endogenous variables and
illustrates what a one unit increase means in terms of network events.
Sensitivity Check Using Two-Mode ERGMs
Two two-mode ERGMs with custom model terms are estimated on the aggregated active and
passive cosponsoring networks to check for reciprocity e↵ects in a cross-sectional setting. The
ERGM on active cosponsoring captures each member’s tendency to take part in drafting new
legislations. The first mode represents 352 members of Congress tying to 125 legislation pro-
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Table 2: Rescaling of regression coe cients: Network scenarios show which network events
are necessary to increase an endogenous statistic by one unit for an event involving member a
and bill b.
Variable One unit +1 unit
Reciprocity: received cosponsor support 0.0036 sponsored a bill 60 days ago and received cosponsor support from average other cosponsor 5 days after a
submitted bill. Unit increase varies for di↵erent half-life specifications: T1/2 = 20 = +0.0036, T1/2 = 50 =
+0.0051, T1/2 = 100 = +0.0038, T1/2 = 200 = +0.0024
Inertia: previously sponsored together 0.0043 sponsored together 60 days ago
Similarity: Cosponsored the same bills 0.0040 sponsored a bill 60 days ago and received cosponsor support from average other current sponsor 2 days after
submission
Shared partners 0.6250 having 2 sponsors in common with average current sponsor (engaged with shared sponsors 60 and 20 days ago)
Member activity - active cosponsoring 0.0245 having sponsored 2 bills, 30 days ago
Member activity - passive cosponsoring 0.1225 having (co)-sponsored 5 bills 10 days ago
Short-term bill popularity 0.1834 current bill got cosponsored 1 day ago
Bill popularity among ideologically di↵erent members 0.0367 current bill got cosponsored 1 day ago by member with di↵ering ideology of 0.2
posals. All endogenous model terms used in the REM (except activity) are re-built as custom
two-mode ERGM terms using the full data on cosponsoring events for the entire duration of the
113th Congress. The custom terms do not incorporate time, but rather reflect raw frequencies.
Control variables are adapted and included as well.
The ERGM on passive cosponsoring captures each member’s tendency to cosponsor an
introduced legislation. The first mode is populated by 352 members of Congress, tying to 64
bills8. The ERGM does not capture time-to-cosponsoring, but rather the singular decision to
cosponsor an introduced bill. As such, the results from the ERGM and the REM on passive
cosponsorship are not comparable and the results of the ERGM are therefore only included in
Section 2 of the SI Online.
For additional information on the two-mode ERGMs, the model terms or in-depth interpre-
tation of the results, please refer to Section 2 of the SI Online.
Results
Results on Active Cosponsorship
Table 3 holds the results of the logisitc regression on the emergence of active cosponsorship
clusters over time. Model (1) shows the results from the cross-sectional two-mode ERGM on
active cosponsorship. Models (2) to (6) show results from the REM using di↵erently weigthed
8The number is reduced as only 64 of the 125 energy bills showed any passive cosponsoring activity.
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reciprocity variables whilst controlling for other endogenous network statistics, homophily
variables and sender-attribute-based controls. Model (7) includes an interaction term of party
alignment on reciprocity.
Results indicate that reciprocity does play a part in the emergence of new collaboration
clusters, in the sense that previous cosponsorship support leads to future collaboration on new
bills. However, the temporal statistics allow for more nuanced interpretations. Both the ERGM
as well as the generally scaled reciprocity variable show positive e↵ects (see Models (1) and
(2)). But these e↵ects are only mirrored in the time-weighted statistics, if the half-life param-
eter is set to 200 event days - essentially opening up the network of past events to incorporate
even temporally distant sponsoring events. The distinction between the reported e↵ects of
the time-weighted statistics becomes evident, when examining an interaction e↵ect with party
alignment. The REM with scaled reciprocity and time-weighted reciprocity with short half-life
parameters of 20 or 50 report a significant and negative reciprocity e↵ect for Democratic mem-
bers and a significant and positive e↵ect of Reciprocity for Republican members of Congress.
Table 3 reports the interaction model with the best fit according to its Bayesian information
criterion (BIC) in model (7). Please refer to Table 3 in the SI Online for complete reports on
the results of the interaction e↵ects on all reciprocity variables.
The significant and positive e↵ects for Republican members of Congress indicates that
previous cosponsoring support issued within the past few months has a strong e↵ect on future
collaborations on new bills. Interestingly, Democratic members do not start working with
members that have recently expressed support for their work.
All models control for a wide range of endogenous network statistics, homophily variables
and other control variables. Collaborations show a strong e↵ect towards inertia, where mem-
bers who have previously sponsored a bill together are more likely to sponsor a bill together
again. Previous studies on legislative cosponsorship have stressed the importance of triadic
closure (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2011). These results cannot be replicated under the present
specifications and using the data on cosponsoring in the 113th U.S. Congress. Triadic clo-
sure even has a negative and significant coe cient. Having two more sponsors in common
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with the average other active cosponsor of the current bill negatively a↵ects the odds of being
involved in the preparation of the current bill. However, homophily tendencies in legislative
collaborations hold under the REMs. Ideological di↵erences, years of service, same state and
neighboring state all show positive e↵ects on collaboration clusters (note that ideological dif-
ferences are measured using an absolute di↵erence term and a negative coe cient indicates
that as ideological di↵erences between members increases, chances of collaboration decrease).
Other than its relatively low explanation power, as measured by McFadden’s pseudo R2, the
models are relatively stable and compare to e↵ects found in the cross-sectional ERGM. Figure 6
depicts precision-recall and receiver operating characteristic curves for the six di↵erent models
that include the interaction e↵ect with party alignment. While models including endogenous
network terms outperform models without, the predictive power of the models are relatively
similar, with the time-weighted model using a half-life of 50 event days slightly outperforming
the others.
Overall the di↵erent models using varied reciprocity statistics give a good overview over the
temporal dynamics of reciprocity in cosponsorship sequences. Whereas Republican members
of Congress are spurred to collaborate with members from whom they recently received favors,
Democratic members show reversed e↵ects, controlling for a broad selection of endogenous
and exogenous e↵ects.
Results on Passive Cosponsorship
Table 4 reports the result of the stratified Cox regression on time-to-cosponsoring. The models
capture which factors hasten a member’s expression of support for an introduced bill. A positive
coe cient indicates shorter survival time or a higher hazard of event occurrence.9
9For each e↵ect, the percentage change in the hazard rate can be calculated via
% h(t) =
 
e (xi=X1)   e (xi=X2)
e (xi=X2)
!
· 100, (23)
where   represents the beta coe cient of a given covariate xi, and X1 and X2 represent two values of the
covariate (Box-Ste↵ensmeier and Jones, 2004, 60).
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Table 3: Results of the logistic regression on active cosponsorship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ERGM REM basic REM 20 REM 50 REM 100 REM 200 REM 50
Reciprocity
Reciprocity: received cosponsor support 0.03⇤⇤ 2.76⇤  0.01 0.04 0.08· 0.08⇤  0.23⇤⇤
(0.01) (1.14) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08)
Reciprocity X party (Republican = 1) 0.45⇤⇤⇤
(0.10)
Other network statistics
Inertia: previously sponsored together 0.03⇤⇤⇤ 0.03⇤⇤ 0.04⇤⇤ 0.03⇤⇤ 0.03⇤⇤ 0.03⇤⇤ 0.05⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Similarity: Cosponsored the same bills  0.01⇤ 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Member activity  2.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤
(0.24) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Shared partners  0.01⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Homophily/heterophily variables
Ideological di↵erences  2.18⇤⇤⇤  2.08⇤⇤⇤  2.25⇤⇤⇤  2.21⇤⇤⇤  2.15⇤⇤⇤  2.12⇤⇤⇤  2.26⇤⇤⇤
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Years of service di↵erences  0.04⇤⇤⇤  0.02⇤⇤  0.02⇤⇤  0.02⇤⇤  0.02⇤⇤  0.02⇤⇤  0.02⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
State homophily 1.48⇤⇤⇤ 1.14⇤⇤⇤ 1.20⇤⇤⇤ 1.19⇤⇤⇤ 1.18⇤⇤⇤ 1.17⇤⇤⇤ 1.16⇤⇤⇤
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Neighboring state 0.84⇤⇤⇤ 0.70⇤⇤⇤ 0.73⇤⇤⇤ 0.72⇤⇤⇤ 0.71⇤⇤⇤ 0.70⇤⇤⇤ 0.74⇤⇤⇤
(0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Gender homophily  0.98⇤⇤⇤  1.42⇤⇤⇤  1.41⇤⇤⇤  1.40⇤⇤⇤  1.39⇤⇤⇤  1.39⇤⇤⇤  1.66⇤⇤⇤
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Ethnicity homophily  0.20·  0.07  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.07  0.16
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Controls
Extreme ideology  0.52⇤  0.24  0.10  0.13  0.18  0.21 0.08
(0.21) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33)
Gender (male = 1) 0.66⇤⇤⇤ 1.41⇤⇤⇤ 1.41⇤⇤⇤ 1.41⇤⇤⇤ 1.40⇤⇤⇤ 1.40⇤⇤⇤ 1.50⇤⇤⇤
(0.11) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
Years of Service 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ordinal time  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
General clustering 0.09⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Party (Republican = 1) 0.14
(0.15)
Intercept  0.76⇤  3.48⇤⇤⇤  3.43⇤⇤⇤  3.45⇤⇤⇤  3.45⇤⇤⇤  3.41⇤⇤⇤  3.69⇤⇤⇤
(0.38) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.36)
BIC 4963.24 4557.71 4562.99 4562.67 4560.49 4559.08 4546.65
McFadden pseudo   R2 0.091 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.091 0.097
⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤ p < 0.05, · p < 0.1; coe cients are reported as log-odds; Dependent variable is active cosponsorship on a specific bill. Coe cients are estimated
using logistic regression models. Model (1) reports results of a two-mode ERGM with custom model terms matching the terms used in REMs without accounting for time.
Model (2) reports the results of a REM using a scaled reciprocity term. Models (3), (4), (5) and (6) report REMs with a time-weighted reciprocity term using 20, 50, 100 and
200 event days as half-life parameters. Model (7) is configured the same as model (4) but including an interaction term of party alignment on reciprocity.
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Figure 6: Precision-Recall and Receiver Operating Characteristics curves for logistic regres-
sion models on active cosponsorship cluster formations over time. Red line represents a REM
without endogenous network statistics; blue line represents a REM with a scaled reciprocity
term; green, violet, orange and yellow lines represent REMs with a time-weighted reciprocity
term using 20, 50, 100 and 200 event days as half-life parameters, respectively.
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Models (1) to (5) show results with di↵erent operationalizations of the temporal reciprocity
statistic. Model (6) includes an interaction term for reciprocity on party alignment.
The main hypothesis with regard to passive cosponsoring events was that recent favors are
repaid in kind with immediate (or temporally close) support on one of the previous supporters’
bills. However, this does not seem to be the case. Previous support does not expedite new
announcements of support, in fact, they seem to even deter from it.
The ERGM on passive cosponsorship reports a highly significant and positive e↵ect for
reciprocity (see Table 2 in the SI Online), indicating that members of Congress do tend to
reciprocate previous support. However, that reciprocation tends to be issued later in time, when
the bill has already been introduced and previous favors are further in the past. An interaction
term with party alignment in model (7) indicates that Democratic members are responsible
for the negative correlation with the event rate. These results raise the question if reciprocity
really guides this passive cosponsorship behavior, as assumed from the cross-sectional ERGM
results. Members do not react to favors by reciprocating them as soon as possible. The stratified
Cox compares the reciprocity statistics for true-events with the statistic for the null-events at
each point in time, determining whether or not a higher reciprocity statistic—increased by
receiving a favor over the past few event days—a↵ects the hazard of event occurrence. Results
indicate that Republican members do not react to receiving favors and Democratic members
are negatively a↵ected by receiving a favor in the past event days.
Results also show some sensitivity to di↵erent half-life parameter specifications. The reci-
procity e↵ect does not show any significant e↵ects for half-parameters of 20 event days (in the
model including an interaction e↵ect with party alignment, see Table 5 in the SI Online). The
a↵ect only becomes negative under the basic reciprocity specification without time-weighting
or with a half-life parameter of 50 or higher. These results do not support the presumption
that receiving a favor from another member of Congress is reciprocated soon after. Rather,
members seem to take time to deliberate which bill to sign and when.
As for the control variables, having cosponsored a lot of the same bills does positively a↵ect
the hazard of event occurrence, as does short-term bill popularity. Short-term bill popularity
31
Table 4: Results of the Cox regression on time-to-passive-cosponsorship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
REM basic REM 20 REM 50 REM 100 REM 200 REM 200
Reciprocity
Reciprocity: received cosponsor support  1.49  0.04  0.17⇤  0.18⇤⇤  0.15⇤⇤  0.22⇤⇤⇤
(1.39) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Reciprocity X party (Republican = 1) 0.11
(0.09)
Other network statistics
Inertia: previously sponsored together  0.01  0.02  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Similarity: Cosponsored the same bills 0.06⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.07⇤⇤⇤ 0.07⇤⇤⇤ 0.07⇤⇤⇤ 0.08⇤⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Member activity 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05·
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Short-term bill popularity 0.39⇤⇤⇤ 0.38⇤⇤⇤ 0.39⇤⇤⇤ 0.39⇤⇤⇤ 0.39⇤⇤⇤ 0.38⇤⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Homophily/heterophily variables
Ideological di↵erences  0.90⇤⇤  0.83⇤⇤  0.88⇤⇤  0.93⇤⇤  0.98⇤⇤⇤  0.80⇤
(0.31) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.33)
State homophily 1.39⇤⇤⇤ 1.40⇤⇤⇤ 1.44⇤⇤⇤ 1.42⇤⇤⇤ 1.38⇤⇤⇤ 1.40⇤⇤⇤
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21)
Neighboring state 0.22 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.17
(0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.28)
Gender homophily  1.64⇤⇤  1.68⇤⇤  1.63⇤⇤  1.58⇤⇤  1.56⇤⇤  1.68⇤⇤
(0.61) (0.61) (0.59) (0.59) (0.58) (0.58)
Years of service di↵erences 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Additional controls
Extreme ideology 1.59⇤⇤⇤ 1.56⇤⇤⇤ 1.56⇤⇤⇤ 1.59⇤⇤⇤ 1.63⇤⇤⇤ 1.69⇤⇤⇤
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
Gender (male = 1) 1.62⇤⇤ 1.64⇤⇤ 1.59⇤⇤ 1.53⇤⇤ 1.50⇤⇤ 1.50⇤⇤
(0.60) (0.60) (0.59) (0.58) (0.58) (0.57)
Years of Service 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Party (Republican = 1) 0.16
(0.22)
AIC 3323.23 3323.66 3320.04 3317.64 3316.37 3314.18
McFadden pseudo   R2 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.077 0.077 0.079
⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤ p < 0.05, · p < 0.1; coe cients are reported as log-odds. Coe cients are estimated using a stratified Cox regression
on the time-to-cosponsoring. Model (1) reports the results of a REM using a scaled reciprocity term. Models (2), (3), (4) and (5) report REMs with
a time-weighted reciprocity term using 20, 50, 100 and 200 event days as half-life parameters. Model (6) is configured the same as model (5) but
including an interaction term of party alignment on reciprocity.
is an interesting variable as it is measured with a very small half-life parameter of only three
event days to capture previous actions on the focal bill just days before member a decides to
cosponsor b. Closer analysis of the e↵ect (reported in Section 5 in the SI Online) indicates that
bill popularity is mostly driven by state- and neighboring state homophily. If a member from
the same or a neighboring state very recently decided to cosponsor a bill, then the hazard of
signing the bill increases drastically. Furthermore, sharing similar ideologies with the original
cosponsors does speed up cosponsoring support, as does knowing that many members among
the active cosponsors are from the same state.
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Conclusion
Relational event models are a powerful tool in examining structural properties of network evo-
lution. This especially holds true for two-mode networks because unlike two-mode network
snapshots, two-mode event sequences cannot easily be transformed into one-mode sequences.
This paper used two-mode cosponsorship event sequences to determine to what extent
cosponsoring activities are guided by reciprocity. Di↵erent operationalizations of temporal
reciprocity statistics were used to assess in which time frames reciprocity reports the most
powerful e↵ects. Results indicate that Republican members reciprocate previous support most
vigorously if they received cosponsoring support within the past few months by working to-
gether on new bills. Democratic members, on the other hand, exhibited negative e↵ects of
reciprocity on the formation of new collaboration clusters. This strong interaction e↵ect is in-
triguing and could be examined further—for instance through modeling additional information
on the target nodes. The formation of new collaboration clusters over time was analyzed using
actor-centered network statistics, such as triadic closure or homophily e↵ects. Future research
could include additional information on the second mode—the bills—to gain further insights
into which bills Republican (or Democratic) members tend (not) to reciprocate previous sup-
port with and what their characteristics entail.
A second analysis was made to gain more information on reciprocity e↵ects on passive
cosponsorship. Passive cosponsorship entails significantly less costs (i.e., by not taking up
a lot of time or resources of a member of Congress) than actively sponsoring a bill could.
Previous results, as well as a two-mode ERGM on passive cosponsorship indicate ample ev-
idence of reciprocity e↵ects for passive cosponsorship. However, when analyzing the timing
of these support statements, results indicated that reciprocity does not expedite cosponsoring
events - indeed, for Democratic members, previously received support correlates with longer
time-to-cosponsoring. The result shows that modeling time-since-event-occurrence could yield
interesting new insights into how human behavior adapts to changes in their surrounding net-
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work. In the case of sponsorship, members are not spurred to reciprocate support soon after
they received it.
It is important to note, however, that cosponsoring data has been widely criticized to incor-
porate too much noise and therefore produce biased results. Future research should use di↵erent
sources to examine Congressional collaboration. For instance, Desmarais et al. (2015) recently
used Senate press events instead of cosponsoring events to measure legislative collaborations.
Rather than aggregating the press events as the authors have done, the sequence of events could
be examined using a logistic regression as presented in this paper.
Methodologically, this paper proposed two di↵erent estimation strategies to analyze event
sequences with unique target nodes or event sequences that show inherent time-dependence in
their target node set composition. Figure 7 provides an overview over the di↵erent relational
event models in use for modeling two-mode event sequences.
Exact-time two-mode event sequences with a time-independent target mode can be treated
like one-mode exact-time sequences. As such, the evolution of events can be examined by
analyzing factors that e↵ect the time-to-next-event, or follow-up time. A political debate can
serve as an example. An exact-time REM of a political debate could examine which political
actors speak out next in a debate to postulate their preferred policy solution (Leifeld, 2017).
Contrarily, whenever the target mode in a two-mode event sequence shows an inherent time-
dependence, factors that a↵ect the reaction time until an event occurs may be analyzed. One
example of another application of such a model would be to examine which endogenous and
exogenous factors play a role in the vetoing timing or which factors spurr an actor to sanction
another actor (Cranmer, Heinrich and Desmarais, 2014).
Discrete-time two-mode event sequences can be modeled using stratified Cox regression
models with times set to a constant (or conditional logistic regressions) (Gail, Lubin and Ru-
binstein, 1980; Allison, 1982). As such, the models estimate the likelihood that an event occurs,
given it has not occurred yet. However, if the target nodes in the sequence are unrepeatable,
this paper has shown that stratified Cox regression (or conditional logistic regression) models
fail due to a non-specifiable risk set. Alternatively, the clustering of sender nodes surrounding
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unrepeatable targets can be examined using logistic regression whilst controlling for all possi-
ble endogenous network e↵ects. One example of another application of such a model would be
to analyze the formation of new scientific collaboration teams over time by examining which
network dependencies matter in the formation of new scientific authorship teams.
There are several limitations to two-mode REMs. First, REMs demand a specific data struc-
ture with a sender mode, a target mode and an ordered or exact-time event sequence. Second,
given that event networks are prone to include thousands of events over a long time period, the
computation of the endogenous network statistics can become computationally intensive. One
solution to this problem is sampling from within the sequence to reduce computation time. Vu,
Pattison and Robins (2015), for instance, propose a nested case-control sampling approach to
deal with large risk set sizes and temporal network statistics. More research on the e↵ects of
sampling is needed. Third, REMs, much like other regression models, may su↵er from omitted
variable bias if the endogenous network e↵ects are not specified su ciently or correctly (Butts,
2008, 160). A good set of measures should be built to assess goodness-of-fit for modeled event
sequences. Such goodness-of-fit measures could help with endogenous network term selection
and further clarify which endogenous e↵ects are indispensable. These last two limitations pose
interesting problems for future research in computational social sciences.
There is little doubt that with greater availability of time-stamped or time-ordered network
data, relational event models are becoming increasingly important in modeling the structural
changes and social processes of networks over time and can thus help strengthen temporal
assumptions of how networks change and adapt over time (de Nooy, 2015). This paper o↵ers
new insights into favor trading in congressional collaborations and raises new questions on how
and particularly when the norm of reciprocity is exercised. The specifications for relational
event models are continuously adapted and expanded and future research on dynamic network
evolutions will undoubtably provide us with new insights into how human behavior evolves
over time.
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Trading Favors - Examining the Temporal Dynamics
of Reciprocity In Congressional Collaborations Using
Relational Event Models
1 Additional Information on Control Variables
1.1 Previous Sponsorship Statistic
Previous sponsorship captures four-cycles that are closed with the current event involving mem-
ber a and bill b. The four-cycle statistic (see Figure 1(a)) entails three past events: (a, j), (i, b)
and (i, j), all of which could be weighted according to the time di↵erence between their occur-
rence in the sequence and the present event time t. However, since the four-cycle is composed
of only active sponsoring events, events (a, j) and (i, j) occur at the same time. Therefore, the
second term is reduced to a 0/1-dummy variable to reduce redundancy. The second term, (i, b),
also cannot be weighted in time, as it gathers all members that currently actively cosponsor bill
b and therefore fall into the same time-spot as t.
The statistic can be operationalized as follows:
previousSponsorship(Gt; a, b) =
P
i2A\{a}; j2B\{b}
wact (a, j) · eact (i, b) · eact (i, j)
P
i2A\{a}
eact (i, b)
, (1)
where the network of past events Gt is filtered for instances where a and other cosponsors
of bill b actively cosponsored another bill j together. A positive coe cient in the logistic re-
gression on active cosponsorship indicates that members have a tendency to work with other
members with whom they’ve worked together in the past. As such, the e↵ect captures a form
of inertia, where past collaboration partners are used in future collaborations. A positive coef-
ficient in the Cox model on time-to-cosponsoring indicates that present member a decides to
cosponsor bill b faster, if a has worked on other bills with member i in the past, and member i
sponsored the current bill as well.
1.2 Cosponsoring Similarity Statistic
Similarly to previous sponsorship or the reciprocity statistic presented in the paper, the cospon-
soring similarity statistic captures a closing four-cycle with passive cosponsorship events:
CosponsoringSimilarity(Gt; a, b) =
P
i2A\{a}; j2B\{b}
wpct (a, j) · eact (i, b) · epct (i, j) · e
( (|tacj  ti j |)·
ln(2)
T1/2
)
P
i2A\{a}
eact (i, b)
(2)
The statistic runs through the network of past events and checks how often member a and
one of the active sponsors of bill b have cosponsored the same bills in the past. More weight is
given to recent cosponsoring activity of a as well as fast reaction time of member i cosponsoring
bill j in the past.
A positive coe cient in the logistic regression on active cosponsorship indicates that mem-
bers have a tendency to start collaboration with each other, if they have passively cosponsored
the same bills in the past. As such, the variable measures something like ideological compati-
bility of two members embedded in the same cosponsoring network.
A positive coe cient in the Cox model on time-to-cosponsoring indicates that members
tend to cosponsor a bill by member i faster, if they have cosponsored the same bills in the past.
1
i1
a j1
b
present event te
past events t < te
(a) closing four-cycle
a b
i1 j1
i2 j2
(b) closing six-cycle
Figure 1: Network e↵ects featuring the closing four-cycle and closing six-cycle e↵ect. Sender
nodes are represented as circles, target nodes as squares.
This captures whether or not members use passive cosponsorship as signals and react to them
in a temporal fashion.
1.3 Shared Partner Statistic
Popular network statistics in one-mode networks are triad or shared partner statistics. They
measure the propensity of two nodes, which each tie to the same third node, to become tied as
well. In two-mode networks the e↵ect is mitigated via the second mode. It measures whether
a sender node a has a tendency to become involved with a target node b given that other nodes
i have already linked to b, and a and i share a large number of other target nodes (see Figure
1(b)). The e↵ect measures whether weak ties eventually become strong ties and sender nodes
engage with loosely connected other senders due to their previous engagement with a shared
partner.
For each sender node a of the current target b, the term measures the number of sender
nodes i1 that two nodes a and i2 have in common:
triadicClosure(Gt; a, b) =
P
i22A\{i1}; j12B\{ j2}
i12A\{i2}; j22B\{ j1}
wact (a, j1) · eact (i2, b) · eact (i1, j1) · eact (i1, j2) · eact (i2, j2)
P
i22A\{a}
eact (i2, b)
(3)
1.4 Member Activity Statistic
The member activity statistic captures outdegree statistics for the current member a at event
time t.
2
activitySender(Gt; a, b) =
X
j2B
wt(a, j) (4)
The statistic runs through the network of past events Gt and sums up all events that include
actor a. The exponential weight function is used to give more recent events more weight. The
half-life parameter controls the decay and was set to 20 event days for both passive and active
cosponsorship models to capture recent member activity. A positive coe cient in the logistic
regression on active cosponsorship indicates that members who have recently sponsored or
cosponsored a bill are more likely to be part of a new collaboration team. A positive coe cient
in the Cox model for time-to-cosponsorship indicates a positive increase in the hazard of event
occurrence if a member has been active in the recent past. Figure 2(a) shows a graphical
representation of the actor activity statistic.
1.5 Bill Popularity Statistic
Bill popularity measures target indegree for the current target b at event time t.
popularityTarget(Gt; a, b) =
X
i2A
wpct (i, b) (5)
The statistic runs through the network of past events Gt and sums up all events that include
bill b. The statistic is used in the Cox model on time-to-cosponsoring to capture recent activity
on the focal bill b. The term is specified with a half-life parameter of 3 event days, giving events
that occurred three days ago only half the weight. As such, the statistic spikes only if within
the past few days another member cosponsored the bill. The term is used to capture whether or
not members react to other members cosponsoring the same bill. Furthermore, the e↵ect can
be coupled with a homophily term, to capture past events that stem from members that share a
attribute with focal member a.
Ideological di↵erences between these cosponsoring members i and a are calculated, as
well as state and neighboring state homophily. Results are reported in Table 6 and show that
ideological di↵erences do not matter in signaling member a to also cosponsor the bill, but state
and neighboring state homophily do.
1.6 Homophily Variables
Several homophily variables are added to control for group formation due to shared similarities.
Two statistics are used, one for categorical member attributes, and one for continuous member
attributes.
The categorical homophily variable simply counts the number of active cosponsors of bill
b that share the same attribute x as member a.
homophily(Gt, a, b) =
X
i2A
et(i, b)[xa = xi] (6)
3
a j2
j1
bpresent event te
past events t < te
(a) Sender activity
bi2
i1
a
present event te
past events t < te
(b) Target popularity
Figure 2: Network e↵ects featuring sender activity and target popularity. Sender nodes are
represented as circles, target nodes as squares.
The continuous homophily variable measures for each active cosponsor of bill b the di↵er-
ences between i and a in terms of z.
absoluteDifference(Gt, a, b) =
X
i2A
et(i, b) · |za   zi| (7)
Positive coe cients in the logistic regression on active cosponsorship indicates that mem-
bers have a tendency to work with members with whom they share similar attributes. For the
absolute di↵erence, the interpretation of a positive coe cient is reversed: a positive coe cient
indicates that as di↵erences between two members increase, they are more likely to form a
collaboration team.
Interpretations for variables in the Cox models on time-to-cosponsoring are analogous.
1.7 Additional Control Variables
As mentioned in the article, several member attributes were included as exogenous control
variables in both models. Among them are their gender, their years of service as well as their
deviance from the mean ideology scores.
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2 Sensitivity Check using Two-Mode Exponential Random
Graph Models
2.1 Exponential Random Graph Models
Exponential random graph models (ERGMs) are used to determine how members of Congress
actively or passively cosponsor a bill.
Two separate ERGMs are calculated for active and passive cosponsorship of energy policy
related bills. Nace refers to the active cosponsorship networks on energy bills and N
pc
e refers to
the passive cosponsorship networks on energy bills. Just like in the REM, however, network
statistics are calculated over the full networks, Nac for the active cosponsorship network and
N pc for the passive cosponsorship network.
ERGMs are a powerful tool to explain the structure of network snapshots. In very short
terms, ERGMs model the probability that a specific network structure is observed over all
possible network permutations (see Cranmer and Desmarais 2011 for a detailed explanation of
ERGMs and Cranmer et al. (2017) for the most recent primer on inferential network analysis).
Markov Chain Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MCMC MLE) is used to es-
timate the models with the ergm package (Hunter et al., 2008) in R (R Core Team, 2016). Good-
ness of fit analysis is performed using the btergm package (Leifeld, Cranmer and Desmarais,
2017) by comparing network statistics to 500 simulated networks based on the estimation of
the model. Tables are reported using the texreg package (Leifeld, 2013).
2.2 Operationalization of Two-Mode ERGM Terms
Operationalizations of network term are comparable to the REM terms. However, instead of
accounting for time and only taking into account the network of past events to count configu-
rations, the ERGM terms use raw frequencies of the networks for the entire time span.
2.3 ERGM on Active Cosponsorship
Table 1 shows the results of the ERGM on the two-mode active cosponsorship network. Results
indicate a positive and significant reciprocity e↵ect, indicating that members who cosponsored
each others bills also have a tendency to work together. As ERGMs report correlations and
disregard time, it is unclear whether past cosponsorship lead to future collaboration on new bills
or whether past collaborations lead the members to cosponsor each other’s bills afterwards. As
such, the results of the ERGM can vary to those of the reported REM on active cosponsorship.
Furthermore, there is a strong tendency to repeatedly work with the same members (positive
and significant result of the ‘inertia’ term). However, members cosponsor the same bills do not
have a tendency to work together on new bills. The member activity term is measured using
a geometrically weighted degree distribution term Hunter (2007, 224). A negative coe cient
for the geometrically-weighted degree distribution term indicates that the network is more cen-
tralized due to its large variance in the degree distribution among the nodes (Levy, 2016). The
control variable for triadic closure shows a negative coe cient, indicating that having more
shared partners in common with other members who actively cosponsor a bill does not corre-
late with working together on other bills. It is possible that previous studies that reported strong
triadic closure e↵ects Cranmer and Desmarais (e.g., 2011); Craig et al. (e.g., 2015) may have
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Figure 3: Goodness-of-fit statistics for the ERGM on active cosponsorship reported in Table 1.
500 networks are simulated from the ERGM.
overestimated triadic closure by projecting the two-mode networks into one-mode networks
(Borgatti and Everett, 1997; Latapy, Magnien and Del Vecchio, 2008; Opsahl, 2013; Everett
and Borgatti, 2013).
As for the homophily and other control variables, the results are comparable to those of the
REM reported in the paper. Figure 3 reports goodness-of-fit statistics for the two-mode ERGM,
calculated using the btergm-package (Leifeld, Cranmer and Desmarais, 2017). Overall the fit
is acceptable.
2.4 ERGM on Passive Cosponsorship
Table 2 reports the results of the two-mode ERGM on the passive cosponsorship network.
The ERGM on passive cosponsorship shows how endogenous and exogenous factors a↵ect the
passive cosponsorship network, disregarding the timing of these cosponsorship ties. As such,
the results are not comparable to the REM, as the REM examines the duration it takes for a
member to cosponsor a bill. However, the ERGM does check, whether reciprocity is a factor in
passive cosponsorship, i.e., whether or not members actually reciprocate each other’s support.
Results indicate that reciprocity is a strong factor in passive cosponsorship networks. Mem-
bers have a strong tendency to reciprocate cosponsorship favors by cosponsoring bills that have
been introduced by members from whom they received cosponsorship supports on their bill.
As for control variables, members who cosponsored the same bills tend to cosponsor each
other’s bills. However, members who worked together on multiple bills show negative e↵ects
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Table 1: Results of the two-mode ERGM on active cosponsorship
(1)
ERGM
Reciprocity
Reciprocity: received cosponsor support 0.03⇤⇤
(0.01)
Other network statistics
Inertia: sponsored together 0.03⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Similarity: Cosponsored the same bills  0.01⇤
(0.00)
Member activity  2.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.24)
Shared partners  0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
Homophily/heterophily variables
Ideological di↵erences  2.18⇤⇤⇤
(0.21)
Years of service di↵erences  0.04⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
State homophily 1.48⇤⇤⇤
(0.17)
Neighboring state 0.84⇤⇤⇤
(0.18)
Gender homophily  0.98⇤⇤⇤
(0.16)
Ethnicity homophily  0.20·
(0.12)
Controls
Extreme ideology  0.52⇤
(0.21)
Gender (male = 1) 0.66⇤⇤⇤
(0.11)
Years of Service 0.00
(0.00)
General clustering 0.09⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Intercept  0.76⇤
(0.38)
BIC 4963.24
⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤ p < 0.05, · p < 0.1; coe cients are reported as log-odds
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Figure 4: Goodness-of-fit statistics for the ERGM on active cosponsorship reported in Table 2.
500 networks are simulated from the ERGM
on passive cosponsorship. Furthermore, passive cosponsorship shows strong tendencies to-
wards homophily on ideological similarities and geographic similarities (same state and neigh-
boring state).
Figure 4 reports the results of the goodness-of-fit analyses for the ERGM. Overall, the fit is
acceptable.
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Table 2: Results of the ERGM on the two-mode passive cosponsorship network
ERGM
Reciprocity
Reciprocity: received cosponsor support 0.05⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Other network statistics
Inertia: sponsored together  0.03⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
Similarity: Cosponsored the same bills 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
Member activity  1.64⇤⇤⇤
(0.32)
General clustering (first mode) 0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
Homophily/heterophily variables
Ideological di↵erences  2.73⇤⇤⇤
(0.22)
State homophily 1.81⇤⇤⇤
(0.20)
Neighboring state 0.98⇤⇤⇤
(0.19)
Gender homophily  0.54⇤⇤
(0.18)
Years of service di↵erences  0.03⇤⇤
(0.01)
Controls
Extreme ideology 0.53⇤
(0.23)
Gender (male = 1) 0.48⇤⇤⇤
(0.12)
Years of Service 0.01⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
Edges  4.16⇤⇤⇤
(0.46)
AIC 4037.17
BIC 4149.48
Log Likelihood  2004.58
⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1
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3 Active Cosponsorship: Additional Models and Results
Table 3 reports the full results on the di↵erent REMs including interaction terms of party align-
ment on reciprocity in active cosponsorship event sequences.
The di↵erent operationalizations of reciprocity paint an interesting picture. The scaled
reciprocity term shows a significant and positive e↵ect for Republican members starting to
work with other members from whom they have received cosponsorship support in the past.
This positive e↵ect is also present in time-weighted reciprocity statistics with short- to longer-
term time weights. Giving more weight to recently traded favors does increase the likelihood
of two members starting to work together. This finding holds for half-life parameters of 20,
50 and 100 event days. However, the e↵ect vanishes for the reciprocity term using a half-life
parameter of 200 that take into account events taking place further in the past. This could point
to the fact that when considering distant favor-trading, all members have some record of this,
in other words, the control group (other members that did not work on the introduction of a
specific bill) have traded at least a few favors with the active sponsors, diminishing the e↵ect
for the true-events (i.e., members that did work on the introduction of a specific bill).
Furthermore, Democratic members show negative e↵ects of favor trading in the short-term
(half-life parameters of 20 and 50). In the long-term (half-life of 100 and 200), the e↵ect
vanishes and control events and true events do not show any di↵erences in favor trading.
The inclusion of the interaction e↵ect does improve model fit a little bit and does not a↵ect
the results of the other control variables drastically.
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Table 3: Results of the logistic regression on active cosponsorship
REM scaled only REM 20, 20 REM 50, 20 REM 100 20 REM 200 20
Reciprocity
Reciprocity: received cosponsor support  4.40·  0.18⇤⇤  0.23⇤⇤  0.09 0.01
(2.37) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Reciprocity X party (Republican = 1) 7.81⇤⇤ 0.26⇤⇤⇤ 0.45⇤⇤⇤ 0.27⇤⇤ 0.09
(2.51) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07)
Other network statistics
Inertia: previously sponsored together 0.05⇤⇤⇤ 0.05⇤⇤⇤ 0.05⇤⇤⇤ 0.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.04⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Similarity: Cosponsored the same bills 0.01 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Member activity 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Shared partners  0.00⇤⇤⇤  0.00⇤⇤⇤  0.01⇤⇤⇤  0.00⇤⇤⇤  0.00⇤⇤⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Homophily/heterophily variables
Ideological di↵erences  2.21⇤⇤⇤  2.30⇤⇤⇤  2.26⇤⇤⇤  2.22⇤⇤⇤  2.20⇤⇤⇤
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Years of service di↵erences  0.02⇤⇤  0.02⇤⇤  0.02⇤⇤  0.02⇤⇤  0.02⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
State homophily 1.15⇤⇤⇤ 1.18⇤⇤⇤ 1.16⇤⇤⇤ 1.16⇤⇤⇤ 1.17⇤⇤⇤
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Neighboring state 0.72⇤⇤⇤ 0.74⇤⇤⇤ 0.74⇤⇤⇤ 0.72⇤⇤⇤ 0.71⇤⇤⇤
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Gender homophily  1.65⇤⇤⇤  1.61⇤⇤⇤  1.66⇤⇤⇤  1.62⇤⇤⇤  1.56⇤⇤⇤
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Ethnicity homophily  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.17  0.19
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Controls
Extreme ideology 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.03  0.00
(0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
Gender (male = 1) 1.50⇤⇤⇤ 1.45⇤⇤⇤ 1.50⇤⇤⇤ 1.47⇤⇤⇤ 1.43⇤⇤⇤
(0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
Years of Service 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ordinal time 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Party (Republican = 1) 0.14 0.32⇤ 0.14 0.19 0.36⇤
(0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17)
Intercept  3.76⇤⇤⇤  3.75⇤⇤⇤  3.69⇤⇤⇤  3.71⇤⇤⇤  3.76⇤⇤⇤
(0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)
AIC 4403.37 4402.07 4395.33 4403.58 4411.17
BIC 4554.70 4553.40 4546.65 4554.90 4562.50
Log Likelihood  2183.69  2183.04  2179.66  2183.79  2187.59
Deviance 4367.37 4366.07 4359.33 4367.58 4375.17
Num. obs. 33088 33088 33088 33088 33088
⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤ p < 0.05, · p < 0.1
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4 Endogeneity Concerns of Endogenous Network Statistics
in Duration Models
The problem of exogeneity of time-varying covariates in duration models has been addressed
in a number of discussions. Box-Ste↵ensmeier and Jones (2004, 95) write that ‘[o]ne of the
strengths of event history models over the traditional regression model is the ability of the event
history model to account for covariates that change values across the span of the observation
period’. However, this inclusion of time-varying covariates also raises a problem. When inter-
ested in the hazard of event occurrence, covariates are used to explain factors that accelerate
failure-time, i.e., time until a observation takes to move from one state (0) to another (1). Lan-
caster (1990) postulates that only covariates that are exogenous to the system under study can
safely be included into the model. And he further argues, that a covariate is considered ex-
ogenous if the values are independent of the duration. However, Box-Ste↵ensmeier and Jones
(2004) argue that this definition is not su cient to determine which variables are endogenous
and which are exogenous. They argue that is ‘largely a theoretical issue’ (Box-Ste↵ensmeier
and Jones, 2004, 96). This is important, since the entire relational event model framework
builds on the construction and analysis of endogenous network statistics that e↵ect the survival
of a dyad in a event sequence (Butts, 2008).
However, the time-weighted reciprocity statistic presented for passive cosponsorship, does
seem to violate the exogeneity rule more than other endogenous statistics.
closingFourCycle(Gt; a, b) =
X
i2A,
j2B
wt(a, j) · wt(i, b) · wt(i, j) (8)
The problem stems from one weighted term wt(i, b) in Equation 8 and the way the duration
is specified.
Instead of examining time-to-next-event, where the duration is specified as the time di↵er-
ence between the last and the focal event, time-to-cosponsoring examines the duration it takes
member a to issue a supportive signature on a specific bill b. This duration is equal to the time
di↵erence between the focal event t and the time the dyad (i, b) takes place. As such, the caus-
ing four-cylce statistic directly incorporates the time-to-cosponsoring duration measure into its
calculation - which is something that does not happen for endogenous network statistics under
the time-to-next-event specification for the duration.
The presented model for passive cosponsorship uses a Cox model with time-varying co-
variates. In a Cox model the actual duration time is not modeled, but rather the ordered failure
times. The model calculates the hazard of event occurrence only at failure times by comparing
the independent and control variables of true events (events where the failure occurred, i.e.,
where the passive cosponsoring event took place) to null events (events where failure did not
occur, i.e., events where passive cosponsorship could have been issued, but was not).
Nevertheless, a simple example using a random variable multiplied with the weighted du-
ration wt(i, b) does show that this inclusion of the time-to-cosponsoring duration renders the
results of the variable highly significant. However, the random variable itself does not show
any e↵ect on the hazard of event occurrence (as it should due to its randomness).
For each event in the passive cosponsoring data set, a random variable between 1 and 100
was assigned:
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## create a random variable
set.seed(1234)
dt.cut$nrIB_random <- runif(nrow(dt.cut), 1, 100)
Afterwards, the random variable was weighted with wt(i, b) using di↵erent halflife parame-
ters:
## add the weight
dt.cut$IBweighted_random.hl20 <- dt.cut$nrIB_random*(exp(-(dt.cut$timeSince)*(log(2)/20)))
dt.cut$IBweighted_random.hl50 <- dt.cut$nrIB_random*(exp(-(dt.cut$timeSince)*(log(2)/50)))
dt.cut$IBweighted_random.hl100 <- dt.cut$nrIB_random*(exp(-(dt.cut$timeSince)*(log(2)/100)))
dt.cut$IBweighted_random.hl200 <- dt.cut$nrIB_random*(exp(-(dt.cut$timeSince)*(log(2)/200)))
Afterwards, a Cox model was estimated to examine the e↵ects of the random and weighted
statistics on the hazard of event occurrence:
fit1a <- coxph(Surv(timeSince, eventdummy) ~ IBweighted_random.hl20
+ strata(eventTime),
data = dt.cut, robust = TRUE)
fit1b <- coxph(Surv(timeSince, eventdummy) ~ IBweighted_random.hl50
+ strata(eventTime),
data = dt.cut, robust = TRUE)
fit1c <- coxph(Surv(timeSince, eventdummy) ~ IBweighted_random.hl100
+ strata(eventTime),
data = dt.cut, robust = TRUE)
fit1d <- coxph(Surv(timeSince, eventdummy) ~ IBweighted_random.hl200
+ strata(eventTime),
data = dt.cut, robust = TRUE)
fit2 <- coxph(Surv(timeSince, eventdummy) ~ nrIB_random
+ strata(eventTime),
data = dt.cut, robust = TRUE)
#$
Table 4 reports the results of the Cox models. As expected, the random variable in Model
5 does not show any significant results on the hazard of event occurrence. However, the four
time-weighted random variables do.
Figure 5 depicts the survival curves for model (1) and (4). The inclusion of the weight
wt(i, b) does distort the survival curves somewhat.
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Table 4: Cox model using random variables weighted with the duration time-to-cosponsoring.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
fit1a fit1b fit1c fit1d fit2
IBweighted_random.hl20 0.08⇤⇤⇤
(0.01)
IBweighted_random.hl50 0.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
IBweighted_random.hl100 0.04⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
IBweighted_random.hl200 0.03⇤⇤⇤
(0.00)
nrIB_random 0.00
(0.00)
AIC 3261.71 3244.49 3329.50 3441.68 3565.56
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00
Max. R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Num. events 447 447 447 447 447
Num. obs. 13587 13587 13587 13587 13587
Missings 0 0 0 0 0
PH test 0.26 0.24 0.48 0.91 0.69
⇤⇤⇤p < 0.001, ⇤⇤p < 0.01, ⇤p < 0.05
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Figure 5: Survival curves for each strata in the passive cosponsorship model using a random
variable as independent variable. Left panel shows survival curves for the random variable
that has been multiplied with the weight wt(i, b), right panel shows the survival curves for the
random variable
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5 Passive Cosponsorship: Additional Models and Results
Table 5 reports the results of the Cox model on time-to-cosponsoring including the interaction
term for party alignment on reciprocity.
Results indicate that in the very short-term (half-life parameter of 20 event days), reci-
procity does not have any e↵ects on passive cosponsorship. However, by increasing the half-
life parameter to give more weight to past events does show a negative e↵ect on reciprocity for
Democratic members of Congress. Republican members do not show any e↵ects, regardless of
how past events are weighted.
Table 6 examines bill popularity in closer detail. The idea is to examine whether members
of Congress are a↵ected by other members issuing their passive cosponsorship support for bill
b. As such, bill popularity measures how many members have issued support for bill b in the
past. The term can be augmented with member attributes, to see which members’ activities
spurs another member a into issuing support for bill b.
The results indicate that state and neighboring state homophily among passive cosponsors
is the driving force. Interestingly, ideological di↵erences do not a↵ect the hazard of issuing
support for bill b. This indicates that members form the same or neighboring state’s signals are
important. It is possible that a member is much more familiar with other members from their
own state and from their neighboring states and therefore catches signals from these members
much better than from members with whom they share ideological similarities. It would be
interesting to see whether geographical distance confirms this signal perception hypothesis and
how it interacts with ideological di↵erences in future research.
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Table 5: Results of the Cox regression on time-to-passive-cosponsorship
REM scaled only REM 20, 20 REM 50, 20 REM 100, 20 REM 200, 20
Reciprocity
Reciprocity: received cosponsor support  6.23⇤  0.12  0.32⇤⇤  0.29⇤⇤⇤  0.22⇤⇤⇤
(2.89) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06)
Reciprocity X party (Republican = 1) 4.47 0.11 0.25· 0.18 0.11
(2.96) (0.09) (0.14) (0.12) (0.09)
Other network statistics
Inertia: previously sponsored together 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Similarity: Cosponsored the same bills 0.07⇤⇤⇤ 0.07⇤⇤⇤ 0.08⇤⇤⇤ 0.08⇤⇤⇤ 0.08⇤⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Member activity 0.05· 0.04 0.05· 0.05· 0.05·
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Short-term bill popularity 0.38⇤⇤⇤ 0.37⇤⇤⇤ 0.38⇤⇤⇤ 0.38⇤⇤⇤ 0.38⇤⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Homophily/heterophily variables
Ideological di↵erences  0.74⇤  0.66⇤  0.71⇤  0.76⇤  0.80⇤
(0.33) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33)
State homophily 1.40⇤⇤⇤ 1.41⇤⇤⇤ 1.45⇤⇤⇤ 1.44⇤⇤⇤ 1.40⇤⇤⇤
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Neighboring state 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.17
(0.29) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
Gender homophily  1.77⇤⇤  1.82⇤⇤  1.74⇤⇤  1.68⇤⇤  1.68⇤⇤
(0.60) (0.61) (0.59) (0.59) (0.58)
Years of service di↵erences 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Additional controls
Extreme ideology 1.71⇤⇤⇤ 1.57⇤⇤⇤ 1.60⇤⇤⇤ 1.65⇤⇤⇤ 1.69⇤⇤⇤
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
Gender (male = 1) 1.61⇤⇤ 1.67⇤⇤ 1.58⇤⇤ 1.51⇤⇤ 1.50⇤⇤
(0.58) (0.60) (0.58) (0.57) (0.57)
Years of Service 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Party (Republican = 1) 0.17 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.16
(0.21) (0.17) (0.19) (0.21) (0.22)
AIC 3319.91 3322.81 3316.92 3314.73 3314.18
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Max. R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Num. events 447 447 447 447 447
Num. obs. 13587 13587 13587 13587 13587
Missings 0 0 0 0 0
PH test 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤ p < 0.05, · p < 0.1
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Table 6: Results of the Cox regression on time-to-passive-cosponsorship examining bill popu-
larity in closer detail
REM (1) REM (2)
Bill popularity
State homophily among recent cosponsors 0.42⇤⇤ 0.38⇤
(0.16) (0.16)
Neighboring state homophily among recent cosponsors 0.40⇤⇤ 0.38⇤⇤
(0.14) (0.15)
Ideological di↵erences among recent cosponsors 0.04 0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Other network statistics
Reciprocity: received cosponsor support  0.14·  0.32⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.11)
Reciprocity X party (Republican = 1) 0.29⇤
(0.14)
Inertia: previously sponsored together  0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
Similarity: Cosponsored the same bills 0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.07⇤⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02)
Member activity 0.03 0.05·
(0.03) (0.03)
Homophily/heterophily variables
Ideological di↵erences  1.09⇤⇤⇤  0.84⇤
(0.31) (0.34)
State homophily 1.25⇤⇤⇤ 1.30⇤⇤⇤
(0.21) (0.20)
Neighboring state 0.11  0.00
(0.25) (0.27)
Gender homophily  1.62⇤⇤  1.78⇤⇤
(0.57) (0.57)
Years of service di↵erences 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Controls
Extreme ideology 1.72⇤⇤⇤ 1.77⇤⇤⇤
(0.33) (0.33)
Gender (male = 1) 1.60⇤⇤ 1.59⇤⇤
(0.57) (0.56)
Years of Service 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Party (Republican = 1) 0.20
(0.19)
AIC 3428.77 3420.80
R2 0.01 0.01
Max. R2 0.23 0.23
Num. events 447 447
Num. obs. 13587 13587
Missings 0 0
PH test 0.93 0.96
⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤ p < 0.05, · p < 0.1
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